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Background: Donation after Cardiac Death (DCD) is one possible solution to the world 
wide organ shortage. Intensive care physicians are central to DCD becoming successful since 
they are responsible for making the clinical judgements and decisions associated with DCD. 
Yet international evidence shows health care professionals have not embraced DCD and are 
often reluctant to consider it as an option for patients.  
Purpose: To explore intensive care physicians’ clinical judgements when selecting a 
suitable DCD candidate.  
Methods: Using interpretative exploratory methods six intensive care physicians were 
interviewed from three hospital sites in Australia. Following verbatim transcription, data was 
subjected to thematic analysis. 
Findings: Three distinct themes emerged. Reducing harm and increasing benefit was a 
major focus of intensive care physicians during determination of DCD. There was an 
acceptance of DCD if there was clear evidence that donation was what the patient and family 
wanted. Characteristics of a defensible decision reflected the characteristics of sequencing, 
separation and isolation, timing, consensus and collaboration, trust and communication to 
ensure that judgements were robust and defensible. The final theme revealed the importance 
of minimising uncertainty and discomfort when predicting length of survival following 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.  
Conclusion: DCD decisions are made within an environment of uncertainty due to the 
imprecision associated with predicting time of death. Lack of certainty contributed to the 
cautious and collaborative strategies used by intensive care physicians when dealing with 
patients, family members and colleagues around end-of-life decisions, initiation of withdrawal 
of life-sustaining treatment and the discussion about DCD. This study recommends that 
nationally consistent policies are urgently needed to increase the degree of certainty for 
intensive care staff concerning the DCD processes.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In Australia organ transplantation is a well-established clinical practice and it is supported by 
the Australian Community. Organ transplantation is now considered a desirable treatment for 
many diseases, which affect organ function 1. Donation after Cardiac Death (DCD) is a 
possible solution to the world wide organ shortage 2. However, it was largely abandoned in the 
1980’s once the neurological certification of death could be legally used to declare death3. 
DCD has been re-introduced in many countries, including Australia, because of improved 
perfusion techniques which have led to better transplant outcomes4.  Recent studies have 
found that health care professionals have not embraced DCD and are reluctant to consider 
DCD as an option for patients2, 5-7.  
There is evidence that health professionals are uncomfortable with the lack of standards 
for mortality prognostication and cardiopulmonary death. Moreover there is a perception that 
a perceived conflict of interest concerning priorities of goals of care exists between the 
junction of end-of-life care and the transition to implementing DCD procedures6. Intensive 
care physicians are also apprehensive when performing clinical assessments that involve a 
prognosis of mortality and making a clinical judgement determining whether a patient could be 
a suitable DCD donor 8. Mortality prognostication and the associated requirement for an 
intensive care physician to predict survival times (to prevent prolonged warm ischaemia) 
following withdrawal of life sustaining treatments (WLST) have created uncertainty and 
trepidation for intensive care physicians[8-11]. It has been shown that uncertainty about 
prognostication is due the wide variation in futility assessments and practice surrounding 
WLST which precedes DCD9-17. 
Decision-making around end-of-life care in critical care has been studied extensively14 
although, the complexities of how intensive care physicians make their judgements prior to 
initiating end-of-life care is not well understood. Current research associated with DCD has 
focused primarily on ethical concerns and clinical objective variables in the international 
setting 4, 6, 18-21 This paper reports the findings of a small exploratory study which sought to 
identify the tensions and complexities experienced by intensive care physicians when 
assessing and identifying potential DCD candidates in Australia.  
 
METHODS 
An interpretative exploratory approach was used to make sense of people’s experiences 
within their own environment. This approach is useful to discover in-depth explanations from 
the perspective of participants when involved in prognostic decision making for the purpose of 
determining mortality and survival times necessary for  DCD candidate selection 22.   
Network sampling technique was used to recruit participants from three hospitals in New 
South Wales, Australia. This sampling method allows researchers to access populations that 
are not easily identifiable or are small in number.  Furthermore, this sampling technique is 
used when eligible people are known to the researcher and participants can involve other 
participants known to them who are interested and eligible 22. All participants were members 
of the Faculty of Intensive Care Medicine and were recruited through an email invitation 
distributed by the Director of the Intensive Care Department or through the New South Wales 
(NSW) Organ Donation Intensive Care Physician Liaison committee. In exploratory qualitative 
research, the sample size is not pre-determined, rather data collection continues until 
saturation of themes is achieved23.  
Data was collected through semi-structured interviews with questions developed from the 
experiential knowledge of the authors and current literature (see table 1). Participants were 
encouraged to expand on their responses by using additional probing questions such as “can 
you please tell me more about…” and “what do you mean by…” Interviews lasted 60-90 
minutes and were conducted in person at a location determined by the participant or over the 
telephone. Only minimal participant characteristics were obtained during data collection as: 1) 
it was not relevant for this type of study, 2) it contributes to protecting participant anonymity, 
and 3) all ethics committees agreed that other demographic details did not add value to the 








Table 1: Interview Questions 
1. Could you tell me the number of patient assessments for potential Donation after Cardiac 
Death you have undertaken?  
2. Could you describe how you make a prognosis of mortality in an intensive care patient? 
3. Could you describe how you determine patient survival time following withdrawal of life 
sustaining treatment? 
4. Please describe the NSW criteria for selecting of Donation after Cardiac Death candidate. 
5. Could you please explain how you select a candidate for DCD? 
6. Please tell me about your experiences of identifying a candidate for DCD. 
7. Which elements of the criteria are 
 i) easier to assess and why;  
 ii) more problematic to assess and why?  
8. Are there any aspects of identifying a DCD donor that you find confronting or inhibiting?  
9. What have you learnt about or developed in your practice related to: 
  i) candidate selection; 
 ii) withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment; and 
 iii) DCD process? 
 
Verbatim transcripts were then subjected to thematic analysis using inductive techniques21. 
Thematic analysis involves searching through the data to identify recurrent patterns. A 
recurrent pattern then becomes a theme. The first analytical step involves coding each 
transcript line-by-line to develop first level codes. Subsequent steps involved grouping the 
initial codes into higher order common categories and then into final interpretive themes. 
These later steps were conducted by both authors independently. Discussion between the 
authors then occurred around the proposed theme. Through an exhaustive process of 
analysis and comparison back to the original transcripts, data were arranged in themes. 
These themes were then evaluated for the most appropriate fit with the original data (i.e. 
rigor). Saturation became evident as no new themes emerged. Finally one of the participants 
was invited to review the themes (i.e. confirmability). 
Both hospital and university ethics approval was obtained at all sites from where 
participants were recruited.  All participants were provided with an information statement prior 
to providing written consent. Each participant also had the option to withdraw consent at any 
time. All intensive care physicians approached agreed to participate (i.e. no-one refused) and 
neither did any participants subsequently withdraw. Interview transcripts were de-identified 
with numbers replacing participants’ names.  
 
FINDINGS 
Six intensive care physicians (5 males) were interviewed from three different hospital sites. 
All participants were qualified intensive care specialists who had, at the time of recruitment, 
performed between two and fifteen DCD candidate selections. Participants described 
having been involved in as little as 30 or “too many to count” end-of-life judgments. 
Thematic analysis revealed three distinct themes: i) reducing harm and increasing 
benefit; ii) characteristics of a defensible decision; and iii) minimising uncertainty and 
discomfort.  
 
Reducing harm and increasing benefit 
    The first theme revealed how increasing benefit to the patient and their families was 
extremely important and a major focus for the participants in this study. If any treatment 
decisions led to harm for dying patients, participants felt it was ethically wrong to proceed with 
discussions concerning DCD. Accordingly, it was important for participants to create a benefit, 
(e.g. initiate palliation and reduce suffering through undesired active treatment) for the patient 
and family. Participants felt it was essential to identify when active treatment was no longer 
curative and ongoing treatment became a burden to the patient. This was expressed by 
participant one as: 
“...people go from being salvageable to being unsalvageable and that you begin to 
recognise when the person is no longer just very sick but is in fact is actively dying 
and that once they move from that and into the face of being inevitably dying that I 
feel quite comfortable that I have reached the limit of my ability to make this person 
better, ……” 
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        There were different factors which participants considered important to determining 
when active treatment became harmful. These factors were: recognising when all reasonable 
treatment options had been exhausted; that death was likely; active treatment was 
inappropriate; and presence of co-morbid conditions. Once it was clear that there was no 
further benefit of active treatment for a patient and death was probable, participants felt it was 
appropriate to consider DCD as an end-of-life care opportunity. The opportunity of DCD might 
then provide a benefit to patients and their families and then this became the goal of care. 
When discussing donation with a family, Participant Six stated: 
“Organ donation is like all the other things that we do in trying to empower patients 
and their families, and if you don’t bring up organ donation then you are denying 
people that opportunity and that may be a bad thing to do for everybody” 
Despite the possible benefits of DCD, participants were extremely conscious that an 
imprecise and uncertain DCD process could be harmful due to a protracted and lengthened 
dying process. Participant six described:  
“… it [donation surgery] was going to be 10 o’clock and they couldn’t get in the 
operating theatre and then an emergency came in and then there was a caesarean. It 
ended up being one in the morning and the family are starting to think this is bloody 
torture, and … and you‘re not sure if they’re going to die. Then you get them down 
there at 2 in the morning, and they don’t die, and then you bring them back to ICU, 
that’s bad.” 
 
Characteristics of a defensible decision 
Theme two revealed intensive care physicians commonly made important clinical 
judgements regarding treatments and care of the patient. Participants described judging end-
of-life, including DCD, as difficult, emotional and required careful consideration. They 
identified characteristics that safeguarded the wellbeing of patients and themselves. These 
characteristics helped participants to feel less vulnerable and open to recourse, and that their 
judgement was robust, justifiable and appropriate. These characteristics were: separation and 
isolation, sequencing, timing, consensus and collaboration, trust, and communication. If at 
least one of these characteristics were missing, participants were more likely to feel 
vulnerable and less able to embark on the subsequent DCD discussion and assessment with 
patients and families.  
Participants identified that multiple decisions were required to WLST prior to DCD, and 
each decision should be made separately in isolation from each other, and in the correct 
sequence. Participants identified a potential for conflict of interest, concerning the correct goal 
of care, if the correct sequence, isolation and separation from previous clinical judgements 
were not achieved. Progression towards DCD was often dependent on the outcomes and 
characteristics of previous end of life decisions. For example, there must be an unequivocal 
judgement that a patient has no hope of a survivable outcome and WLST is appropriate 
before a patient can be considered a suitable DCD candidate. 
Participants were concerned that there may be a perception, from other clinicians and 
family, that end-of-life care decisions, including WLST were initiated for the exclusive purpose 
of obtaining a DCD candidate.  All participants described allowing sufficient timing between 
clinical judgments of WLST and DCD in order to minimise conflict of interests and confusion 
in the goal of care. More time, according to the participants, would (in most cases) allow the 
family to accept the prognosis of inevitable mortality before moving to the next discussions 
concerning end-of-life care. Participant Five stated:  
“.....you may be actually trying to slow things down a bit, hang on a tick, that’s very 
nice and I hear what you’re saying and that’s very important and at this point in time, 
we are doing everything we can to try to get him better Um so, sometimes at least 
when the family raises that [donation] the first thing you need to do is acknowledge 
that but slow [and reorganise] it down a bit.” 
  
Moreover, to reduce the risk of a conflict of interest, participants sought consensus and 
collaboration.  This involved collecting information from other medical staff, the family, and the 
patient (advanced care directives or other documents – if available). Participant four 
described it as: 
“….you have discussions with other medical teams looking after the patient as well as 
the family and the process of withdrawing includes gathering information about the 
patients current illness and their co morbidities before they became unwell, the 
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likelihood that they will survive whatever their problems were, and then getting an 
idea of family, as to what they would wish to be done and liaising with the medical 
teams. So that whole process takes a while, that can take days. So that’s leading up 
to withdrawal. And generally we only do it if we’ve got medical consensus.” 
 
Additionally trust between all of those involved in making clinical judgements regarding 
end-of-life care and DCD was crucial. If there was a reduction in trust, whether actual or 
perceived, between a patient’s family members and the participant, DCD assessment was 
unsuccessful. If trust was absent; other aspects of treatment may be questioned, for example, 
whether the correct clinical diagnosis and prognosis of mortality was made. Furthermore 
communication must be consistent for trust to be formed. Participant two described trust as:  
“I think that they [family members] normally believe you. … I don’t think that they are 
mistrusting. Families, with time they trust and have a relationship based on trust with 
you. I think that if you do not confuse the families [with inconsistent communication] 
and if you are honest and transparent then there is no reason why there should be a 
conflict there” 
 
Minimising uncertainty and discomfort   
The final theme revealed the importance of decreasing the degree of uncertainty and 
discomfort for patients, their families as well as themselves and other intensive care 
physicians. To predict end of life, participants detailed the primary physical assessments they 
performed to increase the accuracy of prediction of length of survival following WLST. The 
assessments included respiratory assessments (i.e. assessment of breathing patterns, use of 
respiratory accessory muscles, apnoea tests, levels of oxygen and ventilator support, and 
degree of spontaneous respiratory effort), neurological assessment (level of consciousness) 
and the presence of cardiovascular instability requiring support. Participants also described 
the need for high levels of clinical experience and confidence when performing an 
assessment of whether the survival time would be longer than one hour (a patient must die 
within to hour following WLST for donation surgery to occur) so that unnecessary or 
ineffective assessments were avoided prior to recommending a suitable DCD candidate. 
Participant five explained: 
“To be quite frank with you that is one of the most difficult areas in this entire DCD 
scenario, I personally am a little bit concerned about the 60 minutes cut off period, 
because there is no way even with my degree of knowledge after this number of 
years in critical care medicine that one could with any certainty predict that the patient 
will actually die within 60 minutes.”   
 
Discomfort was present for all participants when there was uncertainty during end-of-life 
decision making because there could be inconsistency between colleagues. Futility was often 
cited as a reason for WLST but was not well defined; what was futile for one patient was not 
always futile for another. The inconsistency in futility decisions caused discomfort for 
participants because others (colleagues, families or potentially legal authorities) may have a 
different interpretation of what was futile. Participants described how consensus was a way to 
increase consistency and to eliminate the discomfort surrounding futility. Participant two 
expressed a common view: 
“Well it’s not just the national practices after cardiac death it is around withdrawal of 
treatment…. withdrawal of treatment is very different in hospitals in Australasia… very 
different and therefore there is no consistency between our hospital and [another 
hospital in NSW]; between our hospital and New Zealand; between our hospital and 
Western Australia. They’re all different. So we completely lack consistency. That 
leaves us very much more open to question, doesn’t it.” 
 
To eliminate uncertainty and to increase consensus and consistency, concerning WLST 
and DCD, participants expressed the desire for more legislation, policy and protocols. There 
was a perception that: 
You only operate with all party agreement and all party agreement is like … it can 
change awfully usually in the middle of the process and suddenly you don’t have all 
party agreement and then you’re in trouble.”[Participant 2] 
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Another area of uncertainty for participants was the certification of death. Participants 
described uncertainty because of the varied time frames imposed to certify death when the 
patient became a DCD donor.  A participant’s discomfort would be reduced if consistent time 
frames were used in all death certifications concerning donation. Participant six stated that: 
“.. the real problem for me is that the 2, the 5 and the 10 minutes are focused on 
the certification of death, whereas, we have always certified death and we’ve never 
had any problems before, and we haven’t needed anyone to tell us if it’s 2, 5 or 10 
minutes. The real problem with organ donation is what happens after they are dead, 
and it’s a fact that if you are going to take their organs out immediately afterward then 
that is a problem, and we ought to deal with that.” 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study provides insight into the experiences of Australian intensive care physicians 
making clinical judgements concerning prognosis of mortality and candidate selection for 
potential DCD donation. The findings suggest that reducing harm and increasing benefit to 
the patient and family were a motivating factor for engagement of the physicians to make 
decisions concerning mortality prognosis and DCD candidate suitability. Participants used 
processes to safeguard their decisions which made the outcomes defensible.  
Reducing harm and increasing benefit for patients is the corner stone of healthcare. It is 
based within the ethical principle of beneficence whereby physicians have a moral obligation 
to promote the well-being of the patient and reduce pain and suffering 1. In this study mortality 
prognosis and DCD was based on the recognition that the patient was no longer benefiting 
from curative treatment and the burden of harm was greater. The obligation to prevent harm 
has also been reported in other end-of-life care studies conducted in Europe and Canada 11, 
15, 17 but none of these studies were in the context of DCD.  
This study found that DCD decisions were made within an environment of uncertainty due 
to the imprecision associated with predicting survival (or time of death). This uncertainty leads 
to feelings of personal discomfort. According to Fisher and Ridley managing uncertainty is a 
prerequisite for practice in the intensive care 24. Beresford 25 categorised clinical uncertainty 
into three categories: conceptual uncertainty, technical or procedural uncertainty and personal 
uncertainty.  This study found that conceptual and personal uncertainty existed because of 
the inability to apply likely theoretical understanding of survival time in the complex situation 
of DCD.  
The participants in our study explained that once an end-of- life care pathway was 
decided upon, they could consider DCD as a possible benefit for the patient and their family, 
however a major mitigating factor was a prolonged dying process (because of delayed WLST 
necessary to arrange the DCD surgery and recipient allocation). This was considered to be 
burdensome for the patient and their family. Mandell et al also described the burden of 
prolonging the dying process and the possible harm in their national study regarding health 
care professional’s attitudes to DCD6. Yet, according to Mandell et al intensive care 
physicians felt comfortable engaging in the DCD process when the patient’s family initiated 
the possibility of DCD. Our study supports this earlier finding. 
         Furthermore, D’Alessandro et al found that if DCD discussions were initiated by a health 
care professional during end-of-life discussions, rather than by the patient and/or the family, 
this could be perceived as a conflict or interest8. It has also been reported that it is important 
to reduce the risk of conflict by separating the discussion regarding goals of end-of-life and 
DCD, and that the decision concerning WLST should occur prior to any discussions concern 
DCD1,2,4. In this study reducing risk of misunderstanding and conflicts of interest was 
achieved by sequencing, separating and isolating the discussions and judgments concerning 
end-of-life care and DCD. Bernat4 described the boundaries of DCD as essential to reducing 
confusion regarding the goals of care. The Australian National DCD Protocol also 
recommends that separation is essential to the success of the DCD process and candidate 
selection26.  
This is the first study to describe a process using the same person to maintain a 
trusting and consistent relationship when initiating discussions with the family regarding DCD. 
There is some disagreement in the literature, however, regarding whether it should be the 
same or a different person to initiate DCD discussions.  For instance, other studies have 
recommended using a separate person to initiate DCD discussions in order to achieve 
separation and isolation 6, 8, 19.   The Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society 
(ANZICS) statement on organ donation recommends a consistent approach, it does not, 
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however, encourage the introduction of unknown people who have not had the opportunity to 
develop a trusting relationship with the family27. Interestingly, Billings agrees with our findings 
that trust and open and honest communication is crucial when discussing end-of-life with 
families. He also agrees that using another (new) physician in this circumstance should be 
avoided 28. 
      We also found that consensus and collaboration were important in the prognostication of 
mortality and DCD candidate suitability. No previous studies describe these characteristics as 
necessary for DCD discussion to proceed, although, guidelines and consensus statements 
exist for end-of-life discussions 26, 29.  
      
Limitations 
As an exploratory qualitative study, the findings focus on the local context and the particular 
time in which this study took place and while they are not generalisable to a wider population, 
the findings may resonate with other Australian intensive care physicians. Some of the 
participants had few experiences with DCD and this may have limited their understanding and 




This study expands the current knowledge of Australian intensive care physicians’ judgement 
concerning a prognosis of mortality for the purpose of DCD. It demonstrated that physicians 
proceeded to discuss DCD if there was evidence that donation was what the patient and 
family wanted. Uncertainty about the possible harm to the patient or family, and the protracted 
DCD process created the most concerns. Until greater accuracy with predicting death 
becomes available, unambiguous and consistent policy across Australia is urgently required 
to decrease the degree of uncertainty for intensive care physicians.  
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